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Middle powers in the global economy: British
influence during the opening phase of the
Kennedy Trade Round negotiations, 1962–4*
D O N N A  L E E
Abstract. This article reassesses the preparatory negotiations which launched the Kennedy
Trade Round (KTR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in search of a
role for Britain. My purpose is to make two challenges, one theoretical, the other empirical.
Theoretically, this study questions the predominant focus on the structural power of major
states that characterizes the study of international relations in general, and of the GATT in
particular. This is a case-study of middle power influence that focuses on the negotiating skills
and experience of state-level actors at the KTR. Empirically, I question the generally accepted
view that the Anglo-American special relationship was merely a British myth and had no
significance to US foreign policy interests in the 1960s.
Kenneth Waltz argues that ‘the story of international relations is written in terms of
great powers’.1 In his view, outcomes in the international system are determined by
relations between great powers because great powers have immense material power
capabilities. By contrast, middle powers have few resources to influence great powers
either as competitors or as allies.2 In the international system as Waltz concep-
tualizes it, middle powers are unlikely to have much influence.
Yet, as this article shows, Britain did exert considerable influence on US policy
and strategy during the opening phase of the Kennedy Trade Round (KTR) of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). British influence is explained by
the negotiating skills and experience of the British delegation in Geneva.3 Britain
was a middle power with few material power capabilities, but the non-material
resources of state-actors were utilized to exert influence on a great power, influence
which determined the outcome of the opening phase of the KTR.4 The close
diplomatic ties that are a feature of the Anglo-American relationship assisted British
influence on the US. Far from being ‘played out’, as former US Secretary of State
Dean Acheson would have us believe, the so-called Special Relationship provided the
context for fruitful cooperation between Britain and the US during the KTR.
Existing accounts of the KTR have missed this British influence. These accounts
are based either on the personal experience of US officials or on secondary material,
and written almost exclusively from an American perspective.5 They concentrate on
US–European Economic Community6 (EEC) dialogues, and little mention is made
of other participants. This narrow focus, whilst understandable at the time of
writing—when most official records were closed to public scrutiny—needs re-
examination. Recently opened documents provide a broader perspective of the KTR
negotiations and reveal an active and creative British role.
Background to the negotiations
The preliminary KTR discussions began in 1962 and were soon affected by French
President de Gaulle’s rejection of British membership of the EEC in January 1963.
This event both demonstrated the dominant influence of the French in EEC
decision-making, an influence which would continue to be a key feature in the
GATT discussions, and gave renewed impetus to Anglo-American diplomacy. Since
the onset of the Cold War, London and Washington had shared a long-term
commitment to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe and had thus
cultivated ‘joint solutions to joint problems’.7 Going into the KTR, the joint
problems they faced were not limited to high EEC tariffs; there were also the
political difficulties caused by exclusion from EEC decision-making and French anti-
Atlanticism. The US had supported and encouraged British membership of the
EEC, in the expectation that it would boost US influence in Europe via Britain. Of
course, this joint interest was precisely the reason de Gaulle blocked British
membership, fearing Britain would be a Trojan horse for US influence. Indeed, the
non to British membership demonstrated that the EEC countries, especially France,
took for granted that the Anglo-American relationship was close and was an
important factor in US foreign policy.
French wariness of US intentions in Europe restricted the opportunities for direct
US influence on EEC policy during the GATT discussions. Britain, however, had an
ace up its sleeve. It was a full participant in various European organizations, such as
the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA)  which had long been negotiating with the EEC on trade matters. These
links, and persistent British efforts to join the EEC had established channels of
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communication which the US was glad to be able to tap into, via the Anglo-
American relationship, during the opening phase of the KTR. This tactical co-
operation suited both sides, given the fact that London and Washington envisioned
a joint solution to their common trade problems. Summarizing policy positions early
in 1963, a British Foreign Office official stated, ‘There is a basic identity of policy
between the Americans and ourselves because we are both out to reduce barriers to
international trade on a multilateral basis.’ 8
The importance of middle powers in the GATT
How the GATT system, a post-World War II multilateral trade organization based
around a small institution lacking formal decision-making powers, generated co-
operation between rival trading nations and blocs is an interesting question. One
answer is that US leadership and/or hegemony was the decisive factor.9 Young’s
recent analysis of regime formation demonstrates, however, that structural power
alone cannot produce cooperation. Hegemonic leaders, he argues, need to employ
leadership skills to invent ‘institutional options’ (regimes) to encourage coopera-
tion.10 Still, the focus is on the influence of major states in regime formation and
management.11
Accounts of the KTR written in the early 1970s, a time when signs of US
hegemonic decline were all too evident, argue that the difficulties the US faced due
to its declining hegemony weakened its hand in the GATT negotiations. No longer a
hegemon, the US could not impose its liberal trade policy in Western Europe.
Indeed such actions would have proved counterproductive given French anti-
Atlanticism. Thus the relative weakness of US leadership, especially vis-à-vis the
EEC, becomes the decisive factor in explaining the outcome of the KTR.
State Department officials tended to see the KTR as one of the ‘immediate issues
of key importance in Europe’.12 This affected the US negotiating position vis-à-vis
the EEC whose tactics were very much influenced by the perception that the US
could not afford a failure of the Round. It ‘encouraged the belief that the American
negotiators would finally be forced either to increase their own concessions or accept
a level of offers from others previously rejected as inadequate’.13 The emergence of
the EEC as a powerful actor was the major difficulty confronting the US in the
negotiations. US leadership of the GATT was for the first time being tested.
The successful outcome of the KTR is usually explained with reference to the
series of mostly conflicting dialogues between the US and the EEC. As scholars
weave through this conflict, waged largely over industrial and agricultural tariffs, they
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argue that success or failure of the Round depended on the outcome of this two-
actor dialogue. Two questions arise from this over-concentration on the ‘struggle for
power’ between the two major actors. First, how were conflicts settled in the
negotiations? Second, what were other participants doing? My contention is that by
focusing on the second question we can better answer the first. The scant attention
given, until now, to other states’ behaviour suggests that other participants were
passive bystanders. Can this really be the case? What of Japan and Britain, countries
which, because of their high levels of trade, had a high stake in global trade relations? 
Sceptical of the assumed passivity and invisibility of these middle power partici-
pants, I researched the British official records to see what the British delegation were
doing. The records tell an interesting story of British influence, and offer a broader
perspective on how conflict was resolved at the KTR.
It is not surprising that the role of Britain in the KTR and the international
system as a whole during this decade has received little attention. Britain had, by the
1960s, lost its status as one of the Big Three powers. It was a middle power in
economic decline.14 This deterioration, along with the loss of Empire, and foreign
policy embarrassments such as the Suez crisis and the Skybolt decision, made
Britain’s role in the international system difficult to specify. Former US Secretary of
State Dean Acheson was frank in his assessment of Britain’s predicament in 1962
when he argued that ‘Great Britain had lost an empire and has not yet found a role.
The attempt to play a role . . . based on the “special relationship” with the United
States . . . is about played out’.15
Contrary to this widely accepted view, I find that the context of the Special
Relationship provided an opportunity for British influence at the KTR. Influence is
a crucial concept in the study of politics. Generally, it is defined as ‘the modification
of one actor’s behaviour by another’.16 More specifically, influence here is defined as
the modification of US behaviour by Britain. US and British government documents
of the period reveal this influence on a number of significant issues during the
GATT discussions. Here, the preparatory phase of the negotiations from 1962,
through the Ministerial Meetings in May 1963 and May 1964 launching the Round,
to the tabling of industrial exceptions in November 1964, is examined.
Anglo-American relations and the KTR
Though the Special Relationship in the 1960s did not have the strategic significance
it had during World War II and the early Cold War period, the history of the
relationship created a network of elite-level linkages. These persisted and helped
facilitate dialogue between the two states. During the 1960s, Anglo-American
diplomacy was brought to bear on several issues: Cuba, Vietnam, the trilateral
negotiations with West Germany, and the British sterling crisis. The conflict of
interests and difficulty in achieving common positions over these issues strained the
relationship, providing plentiful evidence of divergent interests. The economic
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decline of Britain and the asymmetries of power between the two states meant that
Britain’s significance to the US, at best, fluctuated. Adopting the Achesonian logic,
most conclude that the Anglo-American relationship was a British myth.17 Plainly,
few who study the strategic and military aspect of Anglo-American relations think
otherwise.18 Nevertheless, examination of the trade diplomacy aspect of the relation-
ship in a European context suggests the continued relevance of the relationship to
both.
As large trading nations, the US and Britain shared a vital interest in maintaining
and extending the international liberal trade system. The Kennedy and Johnson
administrations saw increasing exports as the remedy for growing budget deficits.
Britain, whose exports accounted for 13.5 per cent of its gross national product,
sought to halt its economic decline through the same means.19 In contrast, the EEC
countries were trying to build and extend common external tariffs and increase
intra-European trade. Though economic liberalism forms the core of the Treaty of
Rome, they had less interest in supporting liberalization of particular trade interests,
especially agriculture.
The convergence of US and British economic interests led to shared diplomatic
concerns within the European context. Both countries wanted to increase their
influence in Europe in order to restrain the protectionist impulse of the EEC and
counter the growing anti-Atlanticism fostered by de Gaulle. British trade with
Europe was increasing: 40 per cent of Britain’s trade was with the EEC, and only 15
per cent with North America, a powerful economic reason to seek EEC member-
ship. The US encouraged and supported British entry, primarily because of the
political advantages. Britain was the closest of allies, and British policy towards
Europe fell in line with that of the US. British membership, it was argued, would
increase the influence of both in Europe. These economic and political interests
came together in the KTR, leading to high levels of tactical and policy collaboration
in a concerted effort to complete the negotiations.
Conditions for British influence
Britain was the foremost economic and political ally of the US in the negotiations,
and the pre-existing Special Relationship facilitated cooperation between the two.
These factors alone, however, are not sufficient to explain British influence. Other
conditions were necessary. They were: (1) the existence of conflict between the two
major participants—the US and the EEC; (2) a similarity of British and US trade
interests; (3) a tendency of Britain and the US to adopt joint policy positions,
especially when they faced opposition from the EEC. The structure of GATT is also
important.
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Cox and Jacobson’s study of influence in international organizations provides a
useful framework for understanding decision-making in the GATT. They categorize
the GATT as a ‘forum’ organization, meaning it provides the framework of
decision-making on international trade issues but does not make decisions itself or
conduct an independent trade policy.20 Policy-making remains the responsibility of
states acting within the context of the organization. The context of the organization
sets the rules and procedures for the conduct of decision-making. In contrast,
international organizations that make policy decisions independently of states are
described as ‘service’ organizations.21 This distinction is highly significant. As a
‘forum’ organization the GATT lacked a large bureaucratic staff: its secretariat in
the 1960s numbered less than 400. This removes a set of actors seen as a significant
variable in the decision-making processes of ‘service’ organizations. Without this
layer of actors, influence in the GATT is the preserve of national representatives and
their advisers, not the officials and executives of the GATT organization. As the key
actors in the KTR, mostly sheltered from domestic and pressure-group politics as I
explain below, their communications and reports tell the main story of the
negotiations. What follows is an analysis of some of the deliberations of the British
and US participants.
Early conflicts: agriculture and tariff formulae
The US Trade Expansion Act (TEA) of October 1962 gave the President powers to
negotiate tariff reductions with other countries and provided the impetus for
preparatory trade talks leading to the launch of the KTR in May 1963. The TEA
gave the US executive authority to seek tariff cuts of 50 per cent on a linear basis (as
opposed to the item-by-item approach of previous trade negotiations). It specifically
mentioned the aim of reducing tariffs on agricultural products as well as industrial
products. The US laid out these two fundamental goals in preliminary meetings with
the EEC and Britain. Although there was consensus on the need to reduce trade
barriers, the EEC had basic differences with the US over its two key demands. The
EEC was reluctant to include agriculture so early in the negotiations pending
internal agreement on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Six also resisted
adoption of a 50 per cent linear tariff cut without a formula to level out tariff
disparities. They pointed to the high level of several US tariffs compared to
European ones, which meant that even after 50 per cent reduction, US tariffs would
remain higher than European rates. From the onset of the negotiations, this conflict
between tariff reduction (the US position) and tariff harmonization (the EEC
position) posed a problem.
These basic differences had to be overcome before the KTR could get started.
Britain was perhaps more eager than any other country to jump-start the negoti-
ations. Since Britain had failed to become a member of the EEC, completion of the
KTR was essential to British trade interests as the only means of removing trade
barriers between the EEC and EFTA, of which Britain was a member. The Six were
520 Donna Lee
20 Cox and Jacobson (eds.), Anatomy. See also J. A. Finlayson and M. W. Zacher, ‘The GATT and the
Regulation of Trade Barriers’, in Krasner (ed.), International Regimes.
21 Two of the examples given are the International Monetary Fund and the World Health Organization.
wary of an ‘Anglo-American Directorate’ in the KTR, and tended to resist British
just as much as American pressure.22 Furthermore, the prospect of future British
membership reduced the value of British offers at the KTR. Any tariff cuts Britain
offered might have only temporary benefit. For these reasons, Britain’s negotiating
influence was mainly with the US and the other EFTA countries.
The British position on both the points at issue between the US and the EEC was
delicate but equivocal. On agriculture, Britain generally supported the US position
for tactical reasons. British interest in EEC reductions in agricultural tariffs was
slight. Trade in agricultural products with the EEC was minimal, and the system of
Commonwealth preferences meant that Britain maintained high agricultural tariffs
itself. Trade with the EEC was mostly in industrial products, and it was tariffs on
these that Britain wanted to reduce. The difficulty with this was that from the outset
the US emphasized the importance of reductions in agricultural tariffs. Britain
feared that if the US failed to obtain a satisfactory agreement on agriculture, the
KTR would fall at the first hurdle. Indeed, British diplomats acknowledged during
the four years of negotiations that the ‘Kennedy Round will succeed or fail in the
agricultural sector’.23 Britain adopted a strategy of persuading the US to push
ahead on industrial tariff discussions to avoid an impasse, while providing assur-
ances that Britain was fully supportive of the US position on agricultural tariffs and
would actively pursue the inclusion of agriculture in later discussions.
US policy shifts 
From the passage of the TEA in October 1962 to the tabling of industrial exceptions
lists in November 1964, the US negotiators accepted compromise deals on the two
fundamental issues outlined above: the linear tariff formula and agricultural tariffs.
Both required major shifts in US policy.
At the May 1963 GATT Ministerial Meeting the US accepted a compromise on
the general rules on industrial products, namely, a 50 per cent linear tariff reduction
as a working hypothesis rather than as the binding rule the US had pressed for since
the opening of discussions. Industrial tariffs would be subject to a 50 per cent
reduction, but countries would be allowed to draw up exceptions to this. Con-
sequently, most tariff reductions would not be negotiated on a linear basis, but item-
by-item as discussions concentrated on the exceptions lists.
The US and the British agreed that exceptions lists should be kept to a minimum.
Concerted efforts took place to create a formula to set quantitative limits.24 Again
the US representatives found themselves at odds with their EEC counterparts who
argued that US insistence on the 50 per cent reduction would necessitate large
exceptions lists due to the problem of disparities already identified in the initial
discussions. The Six, therefore, would not accept a formula restricting exceptions.
Instead, the EEC put forward its so-called écrétment plan, which proposed unequal
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linear cuts to harmonize tariffs and thus limit the need for exceptions. The US
rejected the écrétment formula on the technical grounds that it went beyond the
authority of the TEA since it required the cutting of some tariffs by more than 50
per cent.
The essential difference between the US percentage formula and the EEC
écrétment plan was one of lower tariffs versus harmonization. This issue loomed so
large that it threatened the launch of the KTR. Yet by the next GATT Ministerial
Meeting of May 1964 the US had dropped its formula and accepted a compromise
deal drawn up by the British, a deal which owed more to the EEC line than that of
the US. This was a big shift in US policy.
Another example of US flexibility occurred in the agricultural sector. In May 1963
the US held fast to its desire to see agricultural tariffs included in the initial
negotiations. By May 1964 it came away from the Ministerial Meeting with no such
commitment from the EEC, yet it tabled industrial exceptions in November 1964
despite the lack of progress in agriculture.
These US policy shifts were not the result of Congressional pressures or of intra-
departmental politics. The strongest indication that domestic influences were absent
is that these would have prevented the US negotiators from accommodating British
and EEC priorities. The Congressional line at the time was clearly protectionist; any
influence it may have had would have resulted in a harder line vis-à-vis the EEC,
particularly on agriculture. A powerful Congress would not have allowed the
shunting of discussion on agricultural tariffs. Besides, Congress was not an influen-
tial factor. Though the US Constitution assigned Congress prime responsibility for
trade policy, executive autonomy was secured by the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Act and
the TEA in 1962. The State Department was insulated from Congressional pressures
at this time. George Ball, US Under-Secretary of State, told Board of Trade (BOT)
officials ‘Congress was more noisy than effective’ and that it ‘could not affect the
negotiations in the Kennedy Round’.25
Nor can US flexibility, especially the climbdown on agriculture, be explained by
intra-departmental politics. Here we would expect to find a shift in influence away
from Agriculture to State. But, according to one account, Orville Freeman,
Secretary of Agriculture, was a marginal figure in trade policy discussions.26 State, it
seems, was always in a dominant position in the trade policy process.27
Another possible source of influence which might explain the shifts in US policy
would be the EEC. However, as stated above, the relationship between the US and
the EEC was difficult. There was little agreement between the two on either broad
policy outlines or particular tariff issues. The EEC was not committed to a
successful KTR, being more interested in the establishment of the Common
External Tariff. This stance produced a reluctance to compromise. French
dominance within the EEC had the potential to disrupt the entire KTR. Christian
Herter, US Special Trade Representative (STR), acknowledged that ‘the French did
not necessarily wish the KTR to succeed’ and that ‘[d]e Gaulle might call an end to
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the whole process’.28 This lack of goodwill on the part of the EEC, coupled with the
anti-Atlanticism of de Gaulle, created a lack of trust between the US and the EEC,
limiting the prospects for successful negotiations.
Clothing the emperor: Anglo-American economic diplomacy
A much better explanation for US policy compromises, as is clearly evident in the
documents, is British influence. As early as November 1962, the British and US
participants were meeting to exchange ideas and work out joint positions for the
KTR.29 Many similar meetings would follow during the course of the Round.
In analysing two years of such meetings from November 1962 to November 1964,
the aim here is to identify two aspects of British influence: (1) how British influence
shaped the US view of the KTR negotiations; (2) how Britain influenced the stakes
the US weighed in their own calculations.
The main tactic of the British in these early meetings was to urge the US to take
the lead in the negotiations, and to encourage the US to offer compromises to the
EEC to prevent deadlock. At the May 1964 Ministerial Meeting the adoption of the
British formula for industrial exceptions and agreement to delay agricultural tariff
talks were sufficient to get the KTR officially started. BOT and FO documents
indicate exactly how hard British officials worked to achieve the necessary shifts in
US tactics and policy. David Ormsby-Gore, British Ambassador in Washington,
cabled:
we had another good talk with Herter this morning and found ourselves in general agreement
on strategy for the May 4th meeting and the immediately following period in GATT
discussions. I think it is now much less likely the Americans will allow themselves to be led
into a public confrontation with the Six at the Ministerial meeting.30
A British official noted after the meeting, ‘perhaps the pressure we exerted on the
Americans to avoid a showdown with the Six may have been helpful here’.31
This pressure had come at two vital meetings in Washington in February and
April 1964. In February a large British delegation led by the Prime Minister, Sir
Alec Douglas-Home, made a two-day visit to Washington to discuss the KTR with
the Johnson administration. The delegation included R. A. Butler, the Foreign
Secretary; Harold Caccia, Permanent Secretary to the FO; Richard Powell,
Permanent Secretary to the BOT; Ambassador Ormsby-Gore and his finance
minister at the Embassy, Eric Roll. As well as the President, the American team
included Secretary of State Dean Rusk; high-ranking State Department officials
such as William Tyler and Robert Schaetzel; STR Christian Herter; National
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy; and Ambassador to Britain David Bruce. The
focus of the discussions was the shared difficulties with the EEC. Both British and
American records of these meetings show how Britain influenced the US view of
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EEC intentions and induced a shift in American calculations regarding what could
be achieved at the upcoming Ministerial Meeting.32
Briefs for the bilateral talks with US officials written by the BOT and the UK
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) indicate the intention of the
British to attempt to reconcile the differences between the US and EEC positions.33
Noting that preliminary discussions at the May 1963 meeting had failed to solve
these problems, the BOT brief pointed out that ‘the U.S. government will shortly
face crucial decisions between risking the failure of the negotiations and modifying
their own objectives and approach’. The report went on to say that the State
Department would be more flexible and more inclined to want to avoid a showdown
compared to the Department of Agriculture and that Christian Herter ‘may stand
somewhere in between’. Recognizing the more effective route for British influence,
the report recommended that ‘our officials should work as closely as possible
together with Governor Herter’s office and the State Department in considering the
best means of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion’.34 The FO brief
was candid in its assessment of which particular US officials were more receptive to
British influence. It recommended that ‘Sir Robert Powell should meet Mr Herter
because he has an open mind and Mr Ball because he was amenable to argument’,
and suggested that his visit in February 1964 ‘might provide an opportunity to
influence Mr Ball and Mr Herter at a time when the Americans were beginning to
re-appraise their policy, but while their thinking was still at a formative stage’.35 The
MAFF brief argued that the US position on agriculture and its insistence on a
linear-cuts approach were ‘too rigid’. Britain must address the EEC–US impasse
using the Anglo-American relationship in order to ‘encourage the Americans not to
adopt too negative an attitude to the Community’s proposals’36 and ‘to prevent the
United States demand for concessions on agriculture being pressed so far as to
endanger the prospect of an exchange of concessions on the duties on industrial
products’.37
A subsequent account of three-way ‘private talks’ over dinner between British, US
and Community officials illustrates the crucial role of the British. In a letter to the
FO, William Hughes, a member of the British delegation, reported frank discussions
with Theodorus Hijzen and Jean Rey of the Commission. From these Hughes
gleaned that the EEC members were keen to pursue bilateral talks with the British as
a solution to the impasse with the US. Rey spoke of ‘our British friends’ and was
receptive to the British ‘compromise on the lines of the Montan draft’. Hughes
illustrated the tensions between the US and EEC, referring to an instance when
‘George Ball came along and gave Rey quite a good dressing down’.38 The British
compromise suggested a varied approach to agricultural tariffs, involving com-
modity agreements for major primary products such as cereals, linear cuts for
processed food products, and assurances of access for other products. This was not
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the linear approach the US sought, but it was a proposal the EEC would willingly
consider.39 At least it would provide a formula to kick-start agricultural
negotiations.
Further talks in Washington in April presented the British with another oppor-
tunity to persuade American officials to change their opinion of what could be
expected from these opening-stage negotiations. The British focused their energies
on discussions with State Department officials and the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR). Noting French reluctance to proceed with the
negotiations, Richard Powell judged that ‘the French would be more or less satisfied
to have nothing happen in the Kennedy Round’.40 Powell voiced concerns about the
rigidity of the US delegation’s approach to the EEC, especially over agriculture,
cautioning that if the US pushed too hard the Six might abort the negotiations
completely. The US officials responded positively to British suggestions, showing a
‘readiness . . . to explore the agriculture field sector by sector’ which ‘corresponds to
our own suggestions’.41 The British proposal encouraged consensus at the May 1964
Ministerial Meeting at which the KTR was officially launched. The outcome did not
fully satisfy the US, but delighted the British. The negotiations on industrial tariffs
could now go ahead. From the outset the priority of Britain had been to secure
reciprocal cuts across the board in the industrial sector.
Following the Ministerial Meeting, discussion centred on industrial tariff dis-
parities which would result from the 50 per cent linear reduction. Negotiations
between the US, Britain, and the EEC concentrated on reaching agreement on
precise rules for these disparities.
The EEC position, largely the product of French policy, sought harmonization of
industrial tariffs by using the écrétment plan, which could not be accomplished with
a fixed percentage linear cut (the US position), according to the EEC, because of
existing tariff differentials. The EEC advocated the écrétment plan as an alternative.
It would require existing high tariffs to be reduced by a greater percentage than
lower ones to remove tariff disparities. This proposal failed to get off the ground,
because the British and the US strongly opposed it. The British and the US had
managed to agree alternatives to the EEC plan based on allowing exceptions to the
linear tariff. Anglo-American cooperation on industrial tariffs had been achieved
very early in discussions following the passage of the TEA in 1962. In November
that year officials from the State Department and the BOT had established a joint
position on the 50 per cent linear cut.42
The EEC agreed to the proposal to modify the US linear formula on the basis of
exceptions. But this concession brought further EEC–US conflict over an agreed
formula on exceptions. At first, the US argued that a quantitative limit should be set
to exceptions.43 The EEC argued that US insistence on a 50 per cent cut would
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necessitate large exceptions lists due to the problem of disparities. It could not,
therefore, accept a formula restricting exceptions.44
On this issue Britain again induced a shift in the US approach to the negotiations.
In January 1963, discussions took place between the two delegations in Geneva on
the problem of how to ensure that the exceptions list to the linear cut was kept
small. Both wanted a minimum exceptions list. Christian Herter explained that US
thinking was that a minimum exceptions list could be achieved by agreeing to
exceptions on a 5 per cent basis. The British took a different view, pointing out that
small percentages could cover a wide range of items, leading to the possibility of a
large list of exceptions, which would ‘play into the hands of the French’.45 Later, in
March 1963, George Ball and Fred Erroll, President of the BOT, discussed the
necessity for percentage limitations on exceptions lists.46 Erroll persuaded the US to
drop its insistence on a percentage formula.
The US eventually accepted the British alternative proposal. A memorandum
from an FO official shows the extent of British influence on this issue. Joe
Greenwald of the US Embassy informed the official that he had witnessed US
discussions after the US–British bilaterals, and the US had
come round to our view; that is they think it would be better to agree that exceptions were to
be kept to a minimum and then proceed by confrontation, rather than to lay down in advance
a formula for the degree of exceptions to be permitted.47
At the GATT Ministerial Meeting in May 1963 the US dropped its commitment
to a percentage formula. The more pragmatic approach of the British prevailed,
enabling the negotiations on industrial tariffs to go ahead on the basis of a 50 per
cent linear cut with a commitment to minimum exceptions but not a formula.
Anglo-American coordination was not just a British tactic. US officials at all
levels saw advantages in cooperating with Britain. For example, in March 1963
Schaetzel stated ‘the more Britain and the United States could compare notes . . .
the better’ and George Ball ‘thought it most important that the United States and
the United Kingdom should act in close concert throughout the preparatory
phases’.48
US receptivity to British influence
The frequency of meetings between the Americans and the British, which increased
as preparations for forthcoming Ministerial Meetings grew more intense, indicates
their value to both nations. According to the British delegation, the ‘Americans seem
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increasingly to value this type of informal exchange and our reception at all levels
has been excellent.’ 49 The Anglo-American special relationship best explains US
receptivity to British influence.
The various institutions emerging from Anglo-American cooperation during
World War II, among them the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Lend-Lease missions, the
huge increase in the number of British personnel in the US and vice versa, created
new linkages and vastly enlarged old ones between the US and British military,
diplomatic and political elites. Such linkages generated high levels of trust, a vital
ingredient of policy and tactical coordination. We know from the Cold War period
that what Churchill called ‘the natural Anglo-American special relationship’50 gave
the British significant influence on US policy.51 This influence made itself felt at the
KTR. Officials from the USTR gained from cooperating with the more experienced
British delegation. The US delegation had little experience of trade negotiations,
and suffered from a large turnover of personnel (for example, Herter died during the
negotiations). As a recently created unit of the Executive Office of the President they
could call on little institutional memory, and most were political appointees with
backgrounds in private industry and business.52 As Hugh Heclo would say, they were
a delegation ‘of strangers’,53 and compared to the professional career civil servants
making up the British delegation (most had taken part in the Dillon Round of the
GATT), they were amateurs at trade negotiation. It is clear from the accounts of the
meetings between the British and Americans that British tactics and ideas were
influential because of US trust and deference.
British influence was not simply that of a broker between the EEC and the US;
Britain had insufficient bargaining power with the EEC to perform this role. Neither
was Britain merely underscoring the US position. Instead Britain played the more
expansive and creative role of soliciting consensus by providing tactical and policy
advice to the US. Making use of the four types of influence of states in international
organizations identified by Cox and Jacobson, Britain had controlling influence.
This is identified as influence ‘conferred upon an actor by other actors’ opinions of
potential for influence’ and manifests itself in the ‘difference between the way an
actor actually behaves and the way he might behave if the controller were not part of
the system’.54 I have identified British influence by demonstrating that: (1) US
positions changed over time; (2) these changes were a direct result of Anglo-
American consultations; and (3) US decisions were consistent with British demands.
These factors influenced the negotiations in circumstances where conflict existed, an
alliance was formed, and the US and British negotiators adopted joint policy
positions. Although Britain initiated and vetoed very little, it still exerted significant
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influence in shaping US views, tactics and policies in areas vital to US economic
interests.
That Britain was no longer a great power, and was certainly less determined (and
less able) to maintain a world role in the 1960s, did not prevent it from enjoying
significant influence in the GATT system. Britain’s reduced economic and military
power meant that other resources had to be applied in order to influence outcomes.
Dean Rusk recognized this much better than his predecessor, Dean Acheson. In a
memorandum to President Johnson in 1967 he argued that ‘The British are still
prepared to play a constructive part in helping maintain world order but they must
now rely on ideas and dexterity rather than military might’.55
Conclusion
Because of the dominance of US realist approaches to the study of international
political economy (IPE) we have become accustomed to the great-power world of
international relations. But unless we give attention to the role of middle-level
participants in the IPE we cannot understand fully the evolution of cooperation.
Recent trends such as the enlargement of the European Union, the creation of
regional trade blocs like NAFTA and APEC, and the growing numbers and size of
private actors such as multinational corporations both generate and represent a
diffusion of power in the IPE, reducing the ability of hegemonic powers to dictate
outcomes. Therefore, an understanding of the influence of actors other than the
great powers is essential to understanding the contemporary IPE. This article is a
case-study of such influence, using the example of Britain in the early 1960s to
illustrate conditions which gave rise to multilateral cooperation in the GATT based
upon the actions of a middle power. The focus has been on state-level actors.
One further point: Dean Acheson’s consignment of the Special Relationship to
the history books is shown to have been premature. In the opening phase of the
KTR this relationship proved essential to the realization of US as well as British
economic and political interests. This and other recent archival research suggests
that most previous studies significantly overstate the atrophy of Anglo-American
relations in this period. Though not having the role of the ‘Greeks in the Roman
Empire’, as Harold Macmillan sentimentally claimed in 1943, Britain still exercised
significant influence in Washington in the 1960s.
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